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A B S T R A C T 
Feed-in-tariff (FIT) schemes have been widely employed to promote renewable energy deployment. 
While FITs may be perceived by consumers as an extra cost, renewable energies cause a noticeable price 
reduction in wholesale electricity markets. We analyse both effects for the case of the Spanish electricity 
market during 2010. In particular, we examine the level of FITs that makes savings and extra costs to be 
similar on an hourly basis. Results are obtained for a wide range of renewable generation scenarios. It is 
found that FITs with null extra costs for consumers are in the range of 50—80 e/MWh. Some of the side-
effects of a high penetration of renewable energy in the market are analysed in detail and discussed. 
1. Introduction 
Several reasons push governments to undertake goals for the 
deployment of Renewable Energy Sources (RES). Among them, RES 
avoid greenhouse gas emissions associated to conventional fossil 
fuel sources by promoting the use of local resources (which in turn 
increases energy sovereignty and improves the external balance of 
payment). In addition, renewable energies are a leading sector that 
allows countries to be at the cutting-edge of several technological 
and scientific fields. Along these lines, the European Commission 
adopted in 2007 the so-called EU climate and energy package, 
whose target (among others) is to provide 20% of European Union's 
energy consumption through RES by 2020. To promote RES, eco-
nomic support schemes are designed at the national level. The 
objective of economic incentives is twofold: first, to internalise the 
advantages of using RES into their cost, in such a way that private 
economic actors receive adequate investment signals. Second, to 
help industry achieve the economies of scale required for a large-
scale RES deployment. 
In parallel, recent years have witnessed a transition in the 
electricity system of Western World countries from a govern-
controlled economic framework towards a more market-oriented 
scenario. The implementation of electricity markets has intro-
duced market mechanisms to set the electricity supply conditions 
(i.e. energy amounts and prices). The Spanish electricity market 
was created in 1997 through Act 54/1997 on the Electricity Sector, 
later developed through Royal Decree 2019/1997 [1]. At that time, 
the existing public support scheme for electricity from RES (RES-E) 
was adapted to this new framework through the implementation of 
feed-in-tariffs (FITs), which was specially successful in promoting 
wind energy [2]. Two important modifications were carried out in 
2004 and 2007 [3,4] in order to modify FIT levels and to encourage 
RES-E producers to participate more actively in the electricity 
market. Such policies proved to be notably successful during the 
first decade of 2000 (see Ref. [5], and references therein) as Spain 
became one of the leaders in photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy 
deployment. In 2008, about half of the worldwide installed PV 
power was located in Spain [6], which in 2010 ranked first in the 
generation of wind power within the European Union [7]. 
FITs are paid by electricity consumers through the so-called 
regulated component of the electricity price. This component 
covers costs associated to national energy policies, costs associated 
to transmission networks, and extra costs related to insular elec-
tricity systems, among others. Notwithstanding, the continuous 
growth of RES-E has led to a noticeable increase of the regulated 
component (see Ref. [8]). As a consequence, FITs have been recently 
called into question, and the underlying benefits that motivated 
their implementation have been disregarded. Along these lines, 
successive royal decrees [9,10] gradually reduced the level of FITs 
received by newly-installed RES-E plants, and retroactive measures 
affecting existing RES-E plants were also implemented. A few years 
later, FITs were finally cancelled for new facilities through Royal 
Decree 1/2012 [11], leading to an abrupt break of the installed 
renewable capacity trend in Spain. Royal Decree-Law 9/2013 [12] 
culminated this process by lowering the level of FITs retroactively 
for the whole of the renewable generators. 
Nonetheless, and focussing merely on an economic standpoint, 
integrating RES-E reduces the electricity price in wholesale elec-
tricity markets. It hence translates to a decrease of the second 
component of the electricity price paid by consumers, the so-called 
market component. This effect is referred to as merit-order effect 
(MOE), and it represents a direct economical benefit derived from 
FIT schemes [13]. Several authors have analysed this effect for 
different case studies. Munksgaard and Morthorst [14] investigated 
the effect of wind power on the Danish power market, concluding 
that wind power allowed for a reduction in the market price of 
around 1-4 €/MWh during 2004-2006. According to Jonsson et al. 
[15], day-ahead wind power forecasts are also likely to have an 
impact on the market price, affecting both the average level and the 
statistical distribution of the electricity price. For a deeper review of 
the impact of wind energy on electricity price, readers are referred 
to Gil et al. [16]. For the Spanish case, a reduction of about 4% of the 
electricity price between 2005 and 2010 associated to the use of 
renewable energies and cogeneration was reported in Gelabert 
etal. [17]. 
As the integration of RES-E entails the two mentioned effects 
(on the one hand, an increase of the regulated component and a 
decrease of the market component on the other), several questions 
arise: Which of the two effects is more relevant? What are the real 
costs of FITs for electricity consumers? Or, more specifically: What 
level of FITs can be paid to RES-E producers without increasing the 
final electricity price (regulated plus market components)? Ac-
cording to Saenz-de Miera et al. [18], wind power generation in 
Spain yielded net cost savings of about 2146 M€ in the period 
2005—2007. Similar figures were obtained by Gil et al. [ 16] between 
April 1,2007 and December 31, 2010. In this line, Sensfuss et al. [19] 
found that renewable energies in Germany had led to a net trans-
ference of profits from producers to consumers. Likewise, Weigt 
[20] studied the impact of wind energy in Germany, concluding 
that, while FITs schemes entailed an extra cost of around 5.4—7 € / 
MWh between 2006 and 2007, these would have enabled a 
decrease in the market price of about 10 €/MWh in the same 
period. In view of these aspects, the present work aims to delve into 
these questions; in particular, into the level of FITs drawn solely 
from savings in the day-ahead market (thus, without extra costs for 
consumers), which is explored on an hourly basis. This would 
eventually contribute to a better framing of the various FIT schemes 
developed during the last decade, as well as to the provision of new 
elements for debates on FIT policies. To this end, real data from the 
Iberian electricity market in 2010 are employed. 
The article is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the day-ahead market for the case of the Iberian 
electricity market. The MOE is introduced in Section 3, together 
with some approaches for its estimation reviewed in the literature. 
Section 4 describes the methodology adopted in this work. Results 
are presented and discussed in Section 5. The paper ends in Section 
6 with some concluding remarks. 
2. The day-ahead market in the Iberian peninsula 
The Iberian Electricity Market,1 MIBEL, is organised as a 
sequence of several markets, namely the day-ahead market, six 
intra-day markets and the ancillary services market. Each market 
contributes to the market component of the electricity price, 
1
 Integrated by the electricity markets of Portugal and Spain from 1 July 2007. 
although the day-ahead market accounts for about 80—90% of this 
component [21]. Based on this, only the case of the day-ahead 
market is considered in this work. 
The day-ahead market is executed once a day. This 
market allows participants to set their positions on an hourly basis 
for the following day. This is done by means of bids, which relate 
prices to amounts of energy that each participant is willing to 
produce/purchase for a certain hour. In order to determine the 
equilibrium between supply and demand, the labour of the Elec-
tricity Market Operator (OMIE) can be summarised as a two-
staged procedure. First, a preliminary market equilibrium is ob-
tained for every hour. With this purpose, generation bids are split 
in constant price segments and sorted in increasing order to build 
a preliminary version of the aggregated supply curve. Similarly, a 
preliminary version of the aggregated demand curve is built by 
sorting the segments of the purchase bids provided by retailers 
and wholesale consumers in decreasing order. The preliminary 
market equilibrium is defined by the intersection of both curves, 
which yields a preliminary market-clearing price and the associ-
ated generation plan (i.e. amounts of energy to be produce/pur-
chased by each participant). Second, the final market equilibrium 
is computed by taking into account additional considerations. 
These are (i) market-splitting, which affects the aggregated de-
mand curve, and (ii) complex conditions, which affects the 
aggregated supply curve. 
(i) Market-splitting takes place when the preliminary equilib-
rium is such that the amount of electricity to be transferred 
between Portugal and Spain exceeds interconnection ca-
pacity. In this case, the market equilibrium is computed 
separately for each country. In practice, the maximum ex-
change capacity is considered as an additional demand bid in 
the exporting country, resulting in a shift of the aggregated 
demand curve. 
(ii) Complex conditions are provided by some producers in order 
to specify additional requirements that can only be checked 
by considering jointly the market results obtained for several 
hours. These conditions can be either technical (for instance, 
to limit the resulting power output gradient of a power plant 
between two consecutive hours to a certain maximum) or 
economical (to condition the switch-on of the power plant to 
a minimum revenue threshold obtained throughout the day). 
In practice, taking complex conditions into account leads to 
the removal of some generation bids, in such a way that the 
aggregated supply curve becomes steeper. 
Once these requirements have been taken into consideration, 
the new pair of aggregated curves provides the final market equi-
librium, namely the market-clearing price, the amount of energy to 
be traded, and the related generation plan for the considered hour. 
For further details on the MIBEL market, readers are referred to 
MIBEL Regulatory Council [22]. 
In order to illustrate these notions, Fig. 1 depicts the aggregated 
curves of the day-ahead market for the 21st hour on 29 January, 
2010. Dashed lines are employed to illustrate the preliminary pair 
of curves and solid lines represent the final curves after considering 
market-splitting and complex conditions. In particular, the shift to 
the right of the demand curve reflects a market-splitting situation, 
Spain being the exporting country in this case. The square marks 
the final market equilibrium situation. As can be seen, the final 
market-clearing price differs substantially from the price at the 
intersection of the preliminary curves, while the amount of energy 
to be traded remains practically unchanged owing to demand 
inelasticity. It is also worth noting that the preliminary pair of 
aggregated curves contain all the bids provided by the participants, 
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Fig. 1. Aggregated curves of the day-ahead market for the 21st hour on 29 January, 2010. 
whereas the final version of the curves are only computed up to the 
market equilibrium point. 
Finally, it should be remarked that the day-ahead market is a 
uniform-price auction, meaning that the price at which producers 
are paid and retailers purchase electricity is the same for all the 
participants and equal to the final market-clearing price. Under this 
framework, generators maximise their benefits by bidding their 
opportunity cost, as this allows them to maximise the likelihood of 
being selected for electricity supply without failing to cover their 
avoidable costs. 
3. The merit-order effect 
In this section, the impact of RES-E on the day-ahead electricity 
market is examined. In particular, we analyse the so-called merit-
order effect (MOE), which relates the market-clearing price reduc-
tion owing to the integration of renewable energy. A brief review on 
MOE estimations (methodologies and results) is also provided. 
As mentioned in Section 1, RES-E producers have been encour-
aged to participate in the market together with conventional gen-
erators. Those among RES-E producers who use a resource that 
cannot be accumulated (mainly wind and PV, which accounted for 
18% of the energy consumption in 2010 [23]) are willing to sell every 
kilowatt-hour at the exact moment that it is generated. In other 
words, the opportunity cost for non-dispatchable energy sources is 
zero. Consequently, and considering the framework described in 
Section 2, their best chance to match the generated energy is to bid 
the expected generation at zero price, which gives them an advan-
tage in the market with respect to non-zero marginal cost tech-
nologies. The counterpart of non-dispatchable technologies is that 
they need to skillfully forecast the expected generation some time in 
advance (around 14—38 h for the case of the day-ahead market in 
the MIBEL) in order to avoid penalties due to deviations from the 
scheduled energy. In addition, accurate forecasts substantially ease 
the labour of the Transmission System Operator (TSO), responsible 
for accommodating intermittent generation under reliable condi-
tions. Actually, there have been recent situations with wind power 
providing more than 64% of the total consumption in Spain, which 
represents an important achievement of the Spanish TSO in man-
aging intermittent generation, specially considering the relatively 
low interconnection capacity of this country. 
As a direct consequence of the integration of renewable en-
ergies2 into the market, a number of bids at null price are added to 
2
 For the sake of simplicity, the term renewable energies is used hereafter to refer 
only to those RES-E sources with opportunity cost equal to zero (that is, PV, wind 
energy and run-of-the-river hydroelectricity). 
conventional generation bids, in such a way that the aggregate 
supply curve shifts to the right, thus lowering the market-clearing 
price. Because all the producing units are rewarded at the market-
clearing price, the aforementioned shift translates to a decrease of 
the market component (introduced in Section 1) of the electricity 
price and, therefore, into savings for electricity consumers. The 
market-clearing price reduction caused by the integration of 
renewable generation leads to the notion of the MOE. Fig. 2 
schematically shows this effect. Scenario A represents a market 
situation where supply (offer A) and demand determine the 
market-clearing price pA (€/MWh) and a total traded energy 
e/\ (MWh). The market cost associated to the generation of this 
amount of energy, CA (€), is given by the area CA = PA-SA- NOW, 
considering a market situation in which a certain amount of 
renewable energy Ae^s (MWh) is added (scenario B), the aggre-
gated supply curve shifts this quantity to the right. In this sce-
nario, the new market-clearing price, traded energy and market 
cost are given by Refs. pB, eB, and cB = Ps-eB, respectively. The idea 
behind the MOE is to reflect the savings derived from the inte-
gration of renewable generation in the market. Thus, the MOE is 
defined as follows: 
MOE = cA- cB=pA-eA-pB-eB. (1) 
As mentioned above, FITs for RES-E cause an increase of the 
price paid by electricity consumers through the regulated compo-
nent. Assuming a single FIT level for all the RES-E, pm (€/MWh),3 
the extra cost, referred to as cprj-, associated to Ae^s is given by: 
CF1T —Pm'&eRES- (2) 
Now, by considering the ratio r between the MOE and the extra 
cost, 
r = 
MOE 
cFIT PfiT-\eRES (3) 
it is possible to evaluate the overall effect of renewable generators 
integrated for a specific hour, that is, whether including Ae^s leads 
to net savings (r > 1) or extra costs (r < 1) for electricity consumers. 
In order to illustrate these notions, Fig. 3 has been performed 
using real data for the 21st hour on 29 January, 2010. For 
3
 It has been assumed that RES-E generators receive the market clearing price 
plus a premium, pm- In fact, most wind generators chose this scheme in 2010, the 
other option being the reception of a fixed tariff regardless the outcome of the 
market. Nevertheless, assuming one or another scheme is irrelevant to the problem 
at hand. 
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Fig. 2. Reduction of the market-clearing price, pA-pB, caused by the addition of a 
certain amount of renewable energy, Ae^s. 
convenience, the preliminary version of the aggregated curves has 
been employed as it gathers bids for both sides of the market 
equilibrium (problems related to the use of the final version of the 
curves are discussed in Section 4). Fig. 3 shows the scenarios 
described above, assuming a renewable generation of 10 • 103 MWh. 
The picture on the left represents Scenario A, where the square 
represents the total cost in the market for this hour, CA- The plot on 
the right (Scenario B) includes bids associated to renewable gen-
eration, leading to a noticeable decrease in the market-clearing 
price, hence a smaller square area associated to market costs, cB. 
In this case, the extra cost due to subsidized renewable energy 
supply, cpn; is also represented. A constant premium of pHT = 50 € / 
MWh over the market price has been assumed for illustrative 
purposes (in practice, different technologies receive different pre-
miums). Under these assumptions, the obtained ratio is r = 1.12, 
meaning that savings owing to the MOE slightly overcome extra 
costs associated to FITs. 
Assessing the exact amount of savings derived from the MOE 
throughout the year is not an easy task. So far, a number of ap-
proaches relying on different hypothesis have been presented. A 
first approach consists in calculating, for each hour of the year, the 
market-clearing price if no renewable generation at all had taken 
place. By comparing the computed price with the actual one and 
taking into account the total amount of traded energy, savings 
caused by the MOE can be estimated. This approach was adopted by 
APPA [24], concluding that savings due to this effect in Spain be-
tween 2006 and 2010 exceeded subsidies received by renewable 
producers. Unfortunately, the analysis cannot be replicated and 
validated because a detailed description of the methodology is 
missing (in particular, it is not clear how the authors address some 
of the problems described in Section 4). 
The approach followed by Sensfuss et al. [19] is radically different. 
The authors developed a simulation tool of the German electricity 
market by modelling the behaviour of different market participants. 
This tool was employed to predict market results under different 
scenarios (with and without renewable generation). The ratio r, 
defined in equation (3), was found to be in the range of 0.4—1 be-
tween 2004 and 2006. It is important to remark that results con-
cerning the German electricity market are not directly transferable to 
the Spanish case because of the dissimilarities between the two 
markets, such as differences in the penetration of renewable gen-
eration, among others. Nevertheless, this work illustrates that the 
MOE is not negligible in the German case. 
In line with this work, Saenz-de Miera et al. [18] proposed and 
validated a market simulation tool for the Spanish case. The study 
was limited to analyse the effect of wind power between 2005 and 
2006. It was found that savings caused by the integration of wind 
energy were substantially higher than the subsidies received by 
this technology. 
The approach of Gelabert et al. [17] is remarkably different as it 
is based on an ex-post statistical analysis of daily averages. This 
approach revealed a negative correlation between renewable 
generation and the averaged market-clearing price in Spain be-
tween 2007 and 2010. Moreover, results show that the related ratio 
r (see equation (3)) was in the order of unity for the mentioned 
period, and close to the estimations obtained by APPA [24]. 
Fig. 4 depicts a comparative summary of the ratio r obtained 
from some of the works reviewed. Despite differences in the 
methodology employed, the estimated savings due to the MOE 
were found to be in the same order of magnitude than the received 
subsidies. This result clearly suggests that, for the considered case 
studies, the extra cost paid by consumers for supporting RES-E 
deployment were roughly compensated by the savings experi-
enced in the wholesale market. 
4. Methodology 
In this section, the methodology employed to analyse the MOE is 
described. Our approach is based in equation (3). This equation 
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shows that the overall effect of renewable energies on the elec-
tricity price, given by the ratio r, depends on three factors: (i) the 
considered level of FITs, pHT; (ii) the amount of integrated renew-
able generation, ACRES; (iii) the aggregated curves, as they deter-
mine, for a specific hour, the dependency of the market equilibrium 
(market-clearing price and traded energy) on the amount of inte-
grated renewable energy, that is, the relationships pg(AeREs) and 
eeCAeREs). 
It is worth remarking that the FIT level that makes the ratio r 
equal to one, denoted here by p*F[T, implies that the increase in 
renewable energy generation would have been obtained at zero 
cost for consumers, as the costs associated to FITs are exactly 
counteracted by savings in the wholesale market. Hence, by setting 
T =\, the following expression is obtained: 
Pm tegES (4) 
Thus, given the aggregated curves for a specific hour (i.e. the 
relationships p ^ A e ^ ) and eB(h.eREs)), equation (4) provides p*F[T 
uniquely as a function of Ae^rs, that is, p|IT(Aei;£S). 
Based on the above, our objective here is to analyse the rela-
tionship between p*FjT and Ae^s for a wide range on renewable 
generation scenarios. With this purpose, real data from the MIBEL 
are employed. Let us consider the aggregated curves for a specific 
hour (see Fig. 1). A first question relates the pair of curves to be 
employed in the analysis, as two options are available: The pre-
liminary and the final version of the aggregated curves. To our 
knowledge, the use of the former is not recommended because the 
preliminary curves do not reflect some features involved in the 
price determination, such as complex conditions and market-
splitting. In particular, as explained in Section 2, considering com-
plex conditions increases the slope of the aggregated supply curve. 
Thus, the preliminary version of the aggregated supply curve 
actually embodies a non-realistic sensitivity of the market-clearing 
price PB with respect to A e ^ . Based on this, the relationships 
Pe(AeREs) and eB(AeREs) are to be obtained from the final version of 
the aggregated curves provided by the market operator. 
A second question relates the procedure to implement the 
different renewable generation scenarios. Two strategies can be 
adopted: 
(a) A first option consists in removing those bids provided by 
wind power and PV generators from the aggregated gener-
ation curve. In this case, the supply curve shifts to the left and 
higher market-clearing prices are obtained. Consequently, 
the analysis is mainly focused on the impact of the existing 
renewable facilities on the market, and the obtained p*m 
values can be employed as a reference for comparing and 
discussing the FITs established by the legislation in force at 
that time, 
(b) Conversely, the second option is to consider the addition of 
virtual bids at zero price, in such a way that the supply curve 
shifts to the right. In this case, the analysis is rather oriented 
to assess the impact of additional RES-E capacity on the 
market, giving insights on what level of FITs had been 
reasonable at that moment for those potential new 
generators. 
In order to choose between the strategies described above, the 
following two considerations should be made. First, for the case of 
the approach described in (a), the different renewable generation 
scenarios arise from considering negative Ae^s values, from zero to 
a certain (negative) value, this value reflecting the total energy 
offered by wind and PV generators for the hour under analysis. The 
drawback of this approach is that there is no available information 
on what bids at zero price were made by these technologies. 
Indeed, while each conventional power unit (gas, carbon and nu-
clear) operates in the MIBEL as a single market participant, power 
units included in the so-called Special Regime4 are allowed to bid 
jointly as a single market participant, in such a way that a single bid 
includes the expected generation of different technologies. 
Consequently, it is virtually impossible to determine the afore-
mentioned total energy offered by wind and PV generators from the 
information provided by the market operator. 
Second, as mentioned in Section 2, it is important to note that 
the final aggregated curves are only obtained up to the point where 
the market equilibrium is reached (see Fig. 1). Hence, no further 
information is provided beyond this point. In light of this, it is clear 
that shifting the final supply curve either to the left or to the right 
makes it impossible to obtain a matching price. Under strategy (a) 
(the aggregated supply curve shifts to the left) this drawback could 
be overcome by extending the supply curve with the initial version 
of this curve (for which the declared complex conditions have not 
been considered). In contrast, computing the market equilibrium 
under strategy (b) would require the final aggregated demand 
curve to be extended with the preliminary one. In our opinion, the 
latter option is more appealing since the single difference (if any) 
between the preliminary and the final aggregated demand curve is 
4
 Special Regime includes electricity generation from any renewable source 
(excluding conventional hydro), cogeneration and wastes. 
the shift due to market-splitting, which can be easily identified and 
accounted for from the available data. In light of this, the strategy 
described in (b) has been adopted. 
To summarize, the main features of the proposed approach are 
the following: 
• Our approach is devoted to obtain the FIT level pFIT that com-
pensates the associated extra costs with the savings obtained in 
the day-ahead market. This is done for different renewable 
generation scenarios (i.e. different values for Ae^ Es)-
• The different renewable generation scenarios are implemented 
by adding bids at zero price. Consequently, the analysis focuses 
on the impact of additional RES-E installations on the market 
results. 
• The analysis makes use of real data provided by OMIE. A first 
consequence is that results are obtained on an hourly basis, 
which keeps pace with the market running; this approach al-
lows for a more refined analysis than those relying on daily 
averaged data [17]. 
• A second consequence of the use of real data is a higher reli-
ability of the results. According to Bode [25], estimating the 
impact of renewable energies on the market results is very 
sensitive to the slope of the employed curves. Thus, the use of 
real curves is deemed to be preferable to market simulation-
based tools [18,19]. 
5. Results and discussion 
In order to estimate the FIT level with zero cost for con-
sumers, p*m, data corresponding to year 2010 were employed. 
This dataset is available at the web page of the market operator 
[21] and it contains all the bids provided by every market 
participant for every hour of the year. It is worth noting that a 
modification was introduced on 1st June as bids, so far provided 
in €c/kWh, started to be provided in €/MWh. The dataset was 
corrected accordingly. 
Following the methodology described in Section 4, the new 
market equilibrium (that is, market-clearing price, pB, and traded 
energy, eB) was obtained for each hour of the year and for different 
renewable generation scenarios (Ae^s)- In particular, Ae^s ranged 
from 10 MW to 10-103 MW in steps of 10 MW. Results were 
collected in functions referred to as pB(AeREs,H) and eB(AeREs.H), 
where H represents a specific hour of the year, ranging from 1 to 
8760. Thus, these functions provide a comprehensive mapping of 
the impact of any additional bid at zero price on the market results 
throughout the year. It is to be noted that the original market 
equilibrium (i.e. initial market-clearing price, p^, and traded energy, 
e/i) is given by Refs. pB(0,H) and eB(0,H). 
As an example, Fig. 5 shows functions pB(AeREs,H) (left) and 
ee(AeREs,H) (right) for three specific hours: H = 797 (H5 on 3/Feb, 
corresponding to off-peak hour), H = AHA (H23 on 18/Jul, corre-
sponding to peak hour) and H = 7062 (H7 on 22/Oct). Focussing on 
the plot on the left, the curve associated to 3/Feb-H5 shows a 
relatively low initial market-clearing price (pB(0,797) = 12.13 € / 
MWh); as expected, this price decreases for increasing ACRES values, 
reaching zero for Ae^s = 3840 MW; beyond this point, following 
generation scenarios provide systematically null market-clearing 
price, while traded energy increases proportionally to Ae#Es (see 
figure on the right), meaning that any amount of extra energy at 
zero price is integrated into the system. Conversely, the curve 
related to 18/Jul, H23 corresponds to a situation with a very high 
initial market-clearing price (pB(0,4774) = 70.01 €/MWh). In this 
situation, null price is not reached even for the maximum Ae^s 
value considered. It can also be noted that, due to demand 
inelasticity, the traded energy remains practically unchanged. 
Finally, the curve related to 22/Oct, H7 shows an intermediate sit-
uation, reaching a market price close to zero for 
Ae^ Es = 10-103 MWh, the maximum value considered in the study. 
Although Fig. 5 merely represents three of the 8760 curves ob-
tained for 2010, it may be observed that the effect of RES-E on the 
market results may become highly dependent on the specific hour 
under consideration. This suggests that important features of the 
results obtained throughout the year might be hidden if averaged 
values are employed. For this reason, in an effort to provide a 
compact and efficient view of the raw maps pB(AeREs.H) and 
eB(AeREs.H), the following approach has been adopted. Let us 
consider a certain renewable generation scenario ACRES = Aeo with 
0 < Ae0 < 10-103 MW. The 8760 samples contained in Ref. pB(Ae0,H) 
can be employed to characterise the statistical distribution of the 
impact of a constant bid Aeo at zero price on pB throughout the year. 
This statistical distribution is to be characterised by means of per-
centiles, PI, P2, ..., P100. Then, by considering the statistical dis-
tributions obtained for the different scenarios, the aforementioned 
percentiles become a function of ACRES- These relationships are 
illustrated in Fig. 6 (left). On the right, a similar picture is obtained 
for the case of eB(AeREs.H). 
Finally, and considering equation (4), map p|IT(AeijEs;H) was 
obtained. A representation of this map in terms of percentiles is 
shown in Fig. 7. Additionally, the histograms related to two specific 
scenarios, p*F[T(2000;H) and p|./T(8000;H), are shown on the right. 
These histograms show a relatively high number of hours with 
p*Fn. = 0. A detailed analysis revealed that these cases are mostly 
related to situations with null market-clearing price for the original 
scenario (Ae^ Es = 0). Indeed, having PA = 0 translates into pB = 0 
regardless the Ae^s value considered, zeroing the numerator in the 
right side of equation (4). 
5.2. Further discussion 
Fig. 7 embodies crucial information to address the main ques-
tion of this work. This figure depicts, for the case of the Spanish 
electricity market in 2010, the rewards that could be assigned to 
newly-installed RES-E plants without incurring in extra costs for 
consumers due to the MOE. The information is provided in terms of 
statistical distributions computed from hourly results and condi-
tioned to a certain level of integrated renewable energy, ACRES- As 
can be seen, the median of this reward evolves smoothly from 50 € / 
MWh to 80 €/MWh for the considered scenarios. For the 66% of the 
hours (the band between percentiles P17 and P83), the premium 
varies from 27 to 118 €/MWh (ACRES = 1-103 MWh) to 50-105 € / 
MWh (Ae^ Es = 10-103 MWh). In order to gain more insight, these 
figures need to be compared with FITs received by technologies 
included in the Special Regime during the same time period. Table 1 
shows the averaged premium according to technology, together 
with the total generated energy (third column) and the generation 
averaged on an hourly basis (rightmost column). It is to be noted 
that only wind power, PV and run-of-the-river hydro bid system-
atically at zero price in the market. 
It is possible to observe that, roughly speaking, most technolo-
gies received a premium in line with the most likely p*m values 
obtained. This result is in good agreement with previous works 
stating that FIT extra cost and savings due to MOE are in the same 
range [17,24]. Consequently, and considering the interpretation of 
the adopted approach (see Section 4), this study supports the idea 
that FIT schemes could have been applied to a large amount of 
additional RES-E generation (up to 10-103 extra MWh per hour, 
and, in view of Fig. 7, probably more) without translating into extra 
costs for consumers. It is noted that the last scenario considered 
(AeREs^lO-103 MWh) represents duplicating the amount of energy 
60-
40-
a. 
2 0 -
', 
_•« 
peak hour 
/: 
y : 
V ' _ _ 
" " " * • • — 
'\. 
* 
off-peak hour 
x^ : 
^ " ^ L , j 
3/Feb-H5 
18/Jul-H23 
22/Oct-H7 
—
 ** V ^ 
t 
" " ' l . 
• - : 
._;._ .( 
j 
A6ji£iS(103MWh) 
10 
24-
2 2 -
20 
peak hour 
_ '
 — _
 " 
_.
/,_ 
^ ^ ^^-off-r eak hour 
3/Feb-H5 
18/Jul-H23 
22/Oct-H7 
"/ 7* 
*-• 
/ • / 
/ / / 
A6ji£iS(103MWli) 
10 
Fig. 5. New market-clearing price pB (left) and traded energy eB (right) as a function of the renewable generation scenario Ae^s for three different hours in 2010. 
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Fig. 6. Probability distribution (in terms of percentiles) of the new market-clearing price pB (left) and traded energy eB (right) conditioned to different renewable generation 
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Fig. 7. Left, probability distribution (in terms of percentiles) of the cost-free FIT, p'm, conditioned to different renewable generation scenarios AeR£s. Right, histograms of p'm, for two 
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Table 1 
Averaged premium and generated energy for every technology within the Special Regime during 2010. Source: [26]. 
Technology Average premium (e/MWh) Total energy (TWh) Mean hourly energy (103 MWh) 
Cogeneration 
PV 
Solar thermal 
Wind 
Hydro 
Biomass 
Waste 
Waste treatment 
Total 
56.40 
414.26 
264.07 
45.57 
44.04 
77.51 
29.78 
81.71 
78.12 
23.68 
6.41 
0.70 
43.14 
6.73 
3.14 
3.12 
4.29 
91.25 
2.70 
0.73 
0.08 
4.92 
0.77 
0.36 
0.36 
0.49 
10.42 
coming from the Special Regime for year 2010 (see Table 1, accu-
mulated value of the rightmost column). The single exception to 
this argument seems to be solar technology (PV and solar thermal), 
whose average premium exceeded by large the results obtained. It 
should be remarked here that the high FIT levels for these tech-
nologies were designed in a context of very high costs of the 
installed MWp. In fact, one of the main objectives of FITs was to 
help the scale up of PV manufacturing and installation to obtain the 
resulting costs reduction. However, and focussing on PV, this situ-
ation has radically changed in the past few years as the levelized 
cost of electricity (LCOE) is quickly approaching 50 €/MWh [27]. 
The striking decrease recently experienced in costs actually enables 
PV to have the potential to reach grid parity for households [28], 
making FITs schemes (and probably current electricity market de-
signs) obsolete in a near future [29]. 
Thus, if there is still room for adding new RES-E capacity under 
FIT schemes without incurring in extra costs for consumers, the 
next question is about who would be bearing the associated 
economical costs. At this point, it should be clear that the MOE 
basically represents an income transfer mechanism from non-
rewarded technologies (mostly, traditional thermal power gen-
eration) towards renewable energies with null opportunity costs. 
As shown in Fig. 6 (left), the MOE triggers an important decrease 
of the market-clearing price in such a way that the median of the 
market price becomes practically null for the last scenarios 
considered (Ae^s close to 10-103 MWh). In parallel, renewable 
energies causing this effect would receive a remuneration of 
PB+PHT- The statistical distribution of this remuneration is 
depicted in Fig. 8 for the different scenarios considered. Inter-
estingly, a remuneration roughly constant of around 100 €/MWh 
can be observed. 
The effects of the income transfer mechanism illustrated in 
Fig. 6 (left) and 8 deserve several comments. First, null clearing-
market prices should come as no surprise since spot markets are 
intended to reveal marginal costs, namely, the marginal cost of the 
most expensive technology required for covering the aggregated 
demand. Under this economical framework, investment costs 
associated to a certain generation plant are assumed to be recov-
ered in the long-term through the gap between the market-
clearing price and the own marginal costs. Herein lies the key 
point of marginal markets, which tend to penalise investments on 
technologies with high initial costs and low (if any) marginal costs, 
such as nuclear and renewable energies. Therefore, in a foreseeable 
large-scale renewable energy integration scenario, FIT schemes has 
the potential to balance this situation in such a way that the elec-
tricity market, so far conceived as a mechanism for covering mar-
ginal costs, becomes progressively a stable framework that also 
covers initial costs as well. 
Second, concerning non-rewarded technologies, some authors 
have pointed that null market prices might provide incorrect in-
vestment signals on back-up power, risking the reliability of the 
P50 (median) 
P33, P67 
P17, P83 
PI, P100 
8 10 
A e f i E S ( ir /MWh) 
Fig. 8. Probability distribution (in terms of percentiles) of the incomes received by 
RES-E generators (new market clearing price + cost-free FIT, ps+Pm) conditioned to 
different renewable generation scenarios, AeR£s. 
electricity supply in the mid/long-term [30]. However, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that electricity markets usually enable addi-
tional remuneration mechanisms for technologies providing 
ancillary services and base-load generation. Specifically, capacity 
payments are usually designed to remunerate available capacity 
regardless of whether it is required for generation or not. This 
mechanism has also been employed as a means to allow traditional 
thermal facilities (such as nuclear, carbon and gas) to recover their 
initial costs [31]. For the Spanish case, capacity payments in 2010 
evaluated on a monthly basis represented between 6.8% and 16.2% 
of the market clearing prices [21]. Whether or not capacity pay-
ments ought to be revised in a context of high renewable pene-
tration is a question to be carefully addressed in the future. This 
exercise ought to be based on a thoroughly analysis of the overall 
remunerations received by traditional facilities throughout the 
different economical frameworks operating in Spain during the last 
decades, as regulatory changes are likely to have rendered windfall 
profits to most of these facilities [32]. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this work, the impact of renewable energies on the Spanish 
electricity market has been analysed. In particular, the balance 
between extra costs associated to feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and savings 
due to the merit-order effect (MOE) was explored on an hourly 
basis for year 2010. Results suggested that there is room for 
integrating technologies with null opportunity cost (namely, wind 
power and PV) under FIT schemes without incurring in extra costs 
for consumers. Specifically, FITs drawn solely from savings in the 
day-ahead market were found to be in the range of 50—80 
€/MWh. In parallel, depending on the considered renewable 
generation scenario, a substantial drop in electricity price may be 
observed. 
Results also suggested that the path towards large-scale 
renewable energy deployment is not a problem with economic 
constraints. Conversely, the increasing share of technologies with 
high investment cost and low marginal cost in the generation 
mix calls for specific-case modifications in the economic frame-
work, which do not necessarily translate into higher electricity 
costs for consumers. As observed, the sole implementation of 
appropriate FITs could help create a stable remuneration 
framework (of around 100 €/MWh) for the mentioned technol-
ogies, at least for the considered generation scenarios (up to 
doubling the energy generated by the Special Regime in Spain in 
2010). 
Perhaps, the main limitation of this study is the assumption that 
the supply bids remain unchanged under the considered renewable 
generation scenarios. A priori, a different behaviour of the gener-
ation units in the market cannot be expected as long as each gen-
eration bid is intended to convey the participant opportunity cost, 
which depends uniquely on the involved technology and not on the 
other participant positions. However, for the case of the Spanish 
electricity market, a reduced number of big firms dominate both 
the wholesale and the retailer market. In this context, according to 
Gelabert et al. [17], the hypothesis of power market cannot be 
discarded. Another mechanism that could modify the aggregated 
supply curve under the different considered scenarios is that of 
complex conditions. As explained in Section 2, complex conditions 
have the potential to moderate the decrease in the market-clearing 
price, as some bids are subjected to be removed from the aggre-
gated supply curve in order to meet additional requirements. The 
use of the final version of the aggregated curves allowed us to ac-
count only for those complex conditions activated for the original 
scenario (Ae^s = 0). In order to account for complex conditions that 
might be activated for the rest of the scenarios, an extended dataset 
fully describing complex conditions for every hour is required. 
Further research is therefore needed to quantify the impact of 
complex conditions on the results obtained in this work. Likewise, 
the hypothesis of constant line capacity with neighbouring coun-
tries could be relaxed in further studios, and more emphasis could 
be placed on a evolving renewable mix, since new PV capacity is 
likely to impact the market more than wind energy due to higher 
market prices during daylight hours. 
One last remark needs to be done. FITs were analysed here on 
the basis of constant electricity cost, this being given by the 
addition of the market costs plus extra costs due to incentives. 
However, in line with Burgos-Payan et al. [8], renewable energy 
deployment entails additional benefits to be considered by policy-
makers. Firstly, the avoided tons of greenhouse gas emissions 
directly translates into savings due to CO2 emission rights that are 
no longer purchased. Secondly, the decrease in the use of fossil 
fuels for electricity generation involves significant savings and a 
major improvement in the exterior balance of payments. Finally, 
promoting renewable facilities in Spain entail additional benefits 
of the utmost importance, even when they cannot be easily 
quantified in economic terms, such as the deceleration of climate 
change (thus a cost reduction of the necessary mechanisms for 
mitigation and adaptation claimed by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change [33]) or the increase in energy sover-
eignty. This last may be particularly significant in a scenario of 
escalating fossil fuel prices and geopolitical issues affecting 
countries from which Spain imports more than 80% of the energy 
that it consumes today. 
References 
[1] MINER (Ministerio de Industria y Energia). Real Decreto 2019/1997, de 26 de 
diciembre, por el que se organiza y regula el mercado de production de 
energia electrica. Spain's Off J BOE December 27, 1997;(310). 1997. 
[2] del Rio-Gonzalez P, Miguel AG. An integrated assessment of the feed-in tariff 
system in Spain. Energy Policy 2007;35(2):994-1012. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.enpol.2006.01.014. 
[3] MIEC (Ministerio de Economia). Real Decreto 436/2004, de 12 de marzo, por el 
que se establece la metodologia para la actualization y sistematizacion del 
regimen juridico y economico de la actividad de production de energia 
electrica en regimen especial. Spain's Off J BOE March 27, 2004;(75). 2004. 
[4] MITYC (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio). Real Decreto 661/2007, 
de 25 de mayo, por el que se regula la actividad de production de energia 
electrica en regimen especial. Spain's Off J BOE May 26, 2007;(126). 2007. 
[5] del Rio-Gonzalez P. Ten years of renewable electricity policies in Spain: an 
analysis of successive feed-in tariff reforms. Energy Policy 2008;36(8): 
2917-29. http://dx.doi.Org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.03.025. 
[6] ASIF (Asotiacion de la Industria Fotovoltaica). Hacia la consolidation de la 
energia fotovoltaica en Espana. Tech. Rep.. 2009. Available at: http://www. 
erasolar.es/pdf%27s/ASIFJnforme_anual_2009.pdf 
[7] EurObservER. Wind power barometer. Tech. Rep.. 2012. Available at: http:// 
www.eurobserv-er.org/press.asp 
[8] Burgos-Payan M, Roldan-Fernandez JM, Trigo-Garcia AL, Bermudez-Rios JM, 
Riquelme-Santos JM. Costs and benefits of the renewable production of 
electricity in Spain. Energy Policy 2013;56(0):259—70. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.enpol.2012.12.047. 
[9] MITYC (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio). Real Decreto 1578/2008, 
de 26 de septiembre, de retribution de la actividad de production de energia 
electrica mediante tecnologia solar fotovoltaica para instalaciones posteriores 
a la fecha limite de mantenimiento de la retribution del Real Decreto 661/ 
2007, de 25 de mayo, para dicha tecnologia. Spain's Off J BOE September 27, 
2008;(234). 2008. 
[10] JE Qefatura del Estado). Real Decreto-ley 14/2010, de 23 de diciembre, por el 
que se establecen medidas urgentes para la correction del deficit tarifario del 
sector electrico. Spain's Off J BOE December 24, 2010;(312). 2010. 
I l l ] JE d a t u r a del Estado). Real Decreto-ley 1/2012, de 27 de enero, por el que 
se procede a la suspension de los procedimientos de preasignacion de 
retribution y a la supresion de los incentivos economicos para nuevas 
instalaciones de production de energia electrica a partir de cogeneration, 
fuentes de energia renovables y residuos. Spain's Off J BOE January 28, 
2012;(24). 2012. 
[12] JE Qefatura del Estado). Real Decreto-ley 9/2013, de 12 de julio, por el que se 
adoptan medidas urgentes para garantizar la estabilidad financiera del sis-
tema electrico. Spain's Off J BOE July 13, 2013;(167). 2013. 
[13] EWEA (European Wind Energy Association). Wind energy and electricity 
prices, exploring the merit order effect. Tech. Rep.. 2010. Available at: http:// 
www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea_documents/documents/publications/reports/ 
MeritOrder.pdf 
] 14] Munksgaard J, Morthorst PE. Wind power in the Danish liberalised power 
market — policy measures, price impact and investor incentives. Energy Policy 
2008;36(10):3940-7. http://dx.doi.Org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.07.024. 
[15] Jonsson T, Pinson P, Madsen H. On the market impact of wind energy fore-
casts. Energy Econ 2010;32(2):313-20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.eneco.2009.10.018. 
] 16] Gil HA, Gomez-Quiles C, Riquelme J. Large-scale wind power integration and 
wholesale electricity trading benefits: estimation via an ex post approach. 
Energy Policy 2012;41(0):849-59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.enpol.2011.11.067. 
] 17] Gelabert L, Labandeira X, Linares P. An ex-post analysis of the effect of re-
newables and cogeneration on Spanish electricity prices. Energy Econ 
2011;33:S59-65. http://dx.doi.Org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.07.027. Supplement 
1(0) Supplemental issue: Fourth Atlantic Workshop in energy and Environ-
mental economics. 
[IS] Saenz-de Miera G, del Rio-Gonzalez P, Vizcaino I. Analysing the impact of 
renewable electricity support schemes on power prices: the case of wind 
electricity in Spain. Energy Policy 2008;36(9):3345-59. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.enpol.2008.04.022. 
[19] Sensfuss F, Ragwitz M, Genoese M. The merit-order effect: a detailed analysis 
of the price effect of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in 
Germany. Energy Policy 2008;36(8):3086-94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.enpol.2008.03.035. 
[20] Weigt H. Germany's wind energy: the potential for fossil capacity replace-
ment and cost saving. Appl Energy 2009;86(10):1857—63. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.apenergy.2008.11.031. 
[21 ] OMIE web page, http://www.omie.es/. [accessed date 16.05.14J. 
[22] MIBEL Regulatory Council. Description of the operation of the mibel. Tech. 
Rep.. 2009. Available at: http://www.erse.pt/eng/electricity/MIBEL/ 
Documents/Description_Operation_MIBEL.pdf 
[23] REE (Red Electrica de Espana). El sistema electrico espanol 2010. Tech. Rep.. 
2010. Available at: http://www.ree.es/es/publicaciones/sistema-electrico-
espanol 
[24] APPA (Asociacion de Productores de Energias Renovables). Estudio del 
impacto macroeconomico de las energias renovables en Espana - ano 2010. 
Tech. Rep.. 2010. Available at: http://www.appa.es/descargas/APPA2010web. 
pdf 
[25] Bode S. On the impact of renewable energy support schemes on power prices. 
Tech. Rep. Hamburg Institute of International Economics; 2006 
[26] CNE (Comision National de la Energia). Informacion Estadistica sobre las 
Ventas de Energia del Regimen Especial. 2011. Available at: http://www.cne. 
es/cne/Publicaciones?id_nodo=143&accion=l&soloUltimo=si&sIdCat=10&. 
[27] Bolinger M, Weaver S. Utility-scale solar 2012: an empirical analysis of project 
cost, performance, and pricing trends in the United States. Tech. Rep. Law-
erence Berkeley National Laboratory; 2013. Available at: http://emp.lbl.gov/ 
sites/all/fiTes/lbnl-6408e_0.pdf 
[28] Breyer C. Global overview on grid-parity. Prog Photovoltaics 2013;21(1): 
121-36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pip.1254. 
[29] Schleicher-Tappeser R. How renewables will change electricity markets in the 
next five years. Energy Policy 2012;48(0):64-75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.enpol.2012.04.042. 
[30] Moreno F, Martinez-Val JM. Collateral effects of renewable energies deploy-
ment in Spain: Impact on thermal power plants performance and manage-
ment. Energy Policy 2011;39(10):6561-74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.enpol.2011.07.061. 
[31 ] Chuang A, Fu F. Capacity payments and the pricing of reliability in competitive 
generation markets. In: System sciences, 2000. Proceedings of the 33rd annual 
Hawaii international conference on; 2000. p. 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ 
HICSS.2000.926762. 
[32] Fabra N, Fabra J. El diseno de mercado para el sector electrico espanol. Papeles 
Econ espanola 2009;121:141-58. 
[33] IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Climate change 2007. 
mitigation of climate change. Working Group III contribution to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Tech. 
Rep.. 2007. Available at: http://www.ipccch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/ 
en/contents.html 
